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Abstract
We propose a model of municipal waste management that combines waste quality
monitoring with leachate control. These inputs modulate two types of uncertainty. First,
waste quality is uncertain, as it arrives from several nonpoint sources and may contain
hazardous waste. Second, while U.S. federal law requires landfill operators to employ these
specific inputs, the rates at which they should be employed to avoid culpable negligence for
environmental damages are uncertain. We extend the economic literature regarding the
management of these types of uncertainty to this municipal waste context.
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1.  Introduction 
  Although much progress has been made in municipal solid waste (MSW) 
management, it is evident from continued policy discussions that the economic aspects of 
MSW management are not yet fully resolved.  For example, there are ongoing 
discussions regarding the number of MSW disposal facilities in various countries and the 
siting of new facilities; the quality of the groundwater surrounding MSW disposal 
facilities; and long-standing tensions regarding interstate and international trade in MSW.  
The economic literature regarding MSW addresses several aspects, including household 
waste generation rates, recycling and disposal choice/behavior, sustainable/green product 
design issues, negative externalities surrounding landfills, optimal pricing of land 
disposal of MSW (tipping fees), waste-to-energy plant possibilities, and the degree of 
economic inefficiency introduced by flow-control statutes.
1  One aspect that has not yet 
received attention is the optimal employment of key inputs necessary for managing the 
uncertain engineering and legal aspects of MSW management.  The purpose of this paper 
is to propose a microeconomic model of MSW management that takes this aspect into 
account.  Such a model would be a more comprehensive one than has heretofore 
appeared in the literature.  
In the abstract, a MSW landfill is a production process that receives waste of 
imperfectly known quality, and by monitoring the waste quality in-flow and restricting 
the out-flow of leachate, isolates such waste for an indefinite period of time.  There are 
two key problems that MSW managers face.  First, a small percentage of municipal waste 
is relatively hazardous waste—such as batteries, motor oil, prescription medication, 
medical sharps, paint, computer parts and other electronics such as television sets—and 
should not have entered the municipal waste stream, despite current laws and guidelines 
to households/firms.  This small but potent flow of relatively hazardous waste combines 
with the great mass of relatively benign—but degrading—waste to create a leachate that 
threatens the biosphere surrounding the landfill.
2  The problem is that this “small but 
potent flow” originates in households and firms on a nonpoint source basis.  That is to 
say, once individuals contribute their MSW to neighborhood pickup trucks, the landfill 
manager cannot discern ownership of any problematic wastes that arrive for disposal and 
contribute to the potentially toxic leachate.  
As Millock et al. (2002) indicate, the extent to which pollution is nonpoint source 
is a function of monitoring technology.  Reminiscent of the history of other nonpoint 
source problems, the lack of technology that would enable better monitoring of disposal 
decisions by households and firms, as well as the lack of leachate control systems in first-
generation landfills, resulted in the fouling of groundwater surrounding multiple landfills.  
The U. S. federal government responded to this growing problem by first passing the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) in 1976, and then in 1991, by creating 
the dual federal requirements that MSW managers must monitor the quality of the waste 
presented for disposal and monitor the quality of the leachate created that may migrate to 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, in the order of these aspects, Jenkins et al. (2003), Choe and Fraser (1999), Fullerton 
and Kinnaman (1996), Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2004), Calcott and Walls (2000), Eichner and Pethig (2001), 
Walls and Palmer (2001), Nelson et al. (1992), Ready and Ready (1995), Palmer et al. (1997), Palmer and 
Walls (1997), Keeler and Renkow (1994), Tawil (1999) and Ley et al. (2002). 
2 See Hamer (2003, 78-79) and Kjeldsen et al. (2002, 320).   
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nearby groundwater.
3  Secondly, the landfill management may be held responsible for 
leachate that migrates to the groundwater, particularly if the groundwater is—or is 
expected to be—utilized as drinking water.
4  Thirdly, state and federal governments 
imposed source-reduction strategies that have reduced the initial flow of problematic 
forms of waste, with the effect of modulating the nonpoint source pollution problem 
before it can be created by households and firms, and therefore before it arrives at MSW 
disposal facilities.  For instance, the State of New York began limiting the mercury 
contents of batteries in 1992.
5  Fourthly, as scholars such as Choe and Fraser (1999) and 
Jenkins et al. (2003) point out, it is possible to structure economic incentives at the 
household level that encourage more attention to legal MSW disposal as well as to 
recycling.  While Choe and Fraser (1999) emphasize the importance of effective 
monitoring to obtaining efficiency, Millock et al. (2002) propose a voluntary monitoring 
program in the presence of nonpoint source pollution that may be quite useful in this 
context.  We shall discuss this possibility further below. 
In this paper, we abstract from the latter two forces that affect landfill health—
waste source reduction and household/firm level monitoring—and focus entirely upon the 
former two forces that are entirely within the control of the landfill operator—waste 
quality monitoring at the landfill gate and leachate control.  The microeconomic aspect 
we find most intriguing regards the ambiguity in U.S. federal law regarding the legally-
binding threshold levels of waste quality monitoring and leachate control.  Indeed, while 
some aspects of landfill health are clearly specified in federal law (such as Table 1 of 
RCRA Subpart D, 40 CFR Part 258.40, which specifies concentration limits for various 
chemicals in the groundwater surrounding the landfill) landfill managers should view 
their compliance with current federal statutes as statistically uncertain on multiple counts.  
First, groundwater tests are subject to statistical error, so that a sequence of tests must be 
taken, and an analysis of variance test performed, before management knows whether the 
standard has been violated from a legal point of view.
6  Second, the statutes recognize 
that it may be uncertain which local party’s contamination is responsible for the 
degradation of a particular water supply.  Lastly, the language of the U.S. federal law 
should leave the manager uncertain of the legal consequences of her disposal facility 
being found culpable—and then being found negligent—for a violation of the statistical 
health standards.
7  In summary, we maintain that MSW management is most 
appropriately modeled as selecting optimal rates of precautionary strategies subject to ex 
ante regulations and an uncertain negligence rule. 
                                                 
3 See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle C, 40 CFR Part 258.20 regarding waste 
input monitoring requirements and Subtitle D, 40 CFR Part 258.40 regarding leachate management 
requirements. This regulation was signed into law in 1991, after studies such as State of New York (1986) 
revealed weaknesses in on-site waste quality monitoring procedures. 
4 See 40 CFR Part 258.57 (Selection of Remedy), particularly section (e). 
5 New York Statute S-27-0719(3).   
6 See 40 CFR Part 258.53 (Groundwater Sampling and Analysis Requirements).  This would seem to be 
increasingly problematic as the landfill ages, for Mendes et al. (2004, 53) state: “As widely described in the 
literature, it is generally accepted that most landfill liners will eventually develop leaks; hence, some of the 
leachate will leak out.  The assumption adopted is that over the life of the landfill, 70% of leachate will be 
collected and treated, and 30% will leak out without any treatment.”   
7 See in particular 40 CFR Part 258.57(e). 
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We are not aware of MSW research that formalizes this type of problem; however, 
these types and apparent magnitudes of uncertainty in MSW disposal practice have been 
addressed in multiple strands of law and economics literature by researchers such as 
Beavis and Dobbs (1987), Shavell (1987), Kolstad et al. (1990), Bartsch (1997), Dyar 
and Wagner (2003), and Hutchinson and van’t Veld (2005).  Our model, presented in 
Section 2, shows how aspects of this literature can be combined in new ways to yield 
insights in the MSW context.  The model is sufficiently abstract to enable focus upon 
what we view as the key aspects of landfill environmental/financial health; yet, the model 
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate aspects of the landfill manager’s concern that 
occur off-site (such as the relatively unobservable waste sorting decisions of households).  
The model provides a foundation to which complicating factors discussed in Section 3 
may be added.  As well, the framework suggests multiple testable hypotheses and 
directions for future research, also discussed in Section 3.   
 
2.  The Model 
As we described above, landfill operators produce a service comprising 
acceptance of nonpoint source generated waste.  Since the waste is generated on a 
nonpoint source basis, the flow of municipal solid waste Q that the landfill operator 
receives is of uncertain quality and can cause environmental damage for which the 
landfill operator may or may not be found culpably negligent.  Let the flow of Q (again, 
of uncertain quality) that a landfill operator chooses to accept be a function of two inputs: 
waste quality in-flow monitoring resources M and waste out-flow (leachate) control 
resources L.  The landfill operator employs technology Q(L,M), which we assume is a 
continuous and differentiable function that characterizes M and L as weak substitutes in 
managing MSW.  Even if the waste is expected to be perfectly benign—such as yard 
clippings—we propose that positive amounts of both waste quality monitoring and 
leachate control are necessary in order to distinguish a waste management facility from a 
“dump”.  We assume that inputs M and L can be obtained at perfectly competitive prices 
 and  .  Suppose further that the landfill operator offers disposal services in a 
perfectly competitive market at price p.  
M w L w
The final aspect to capture in the model regards the expected environmental 
damages (in dollars) that could arise if there is a breach of the landfill’s leachate control 
technology and the landfill operator is judged to be culpably negligent in her 
management practice.  Suppose that the probability π of damage occurring is a 
continuous, differentiable function of M and L, so that we have π(L,M).  Moreover, 
assume that the dollar estimate of the environmental (including possible punitive) 
damages D a breach could cause is likewise a continuous and differentiable function of 
monitoring effort M and leachate control effort L, so that we have D(L,M).  Then, as in 
literature such as Kolstad et al. (1990, 890), the expected damages can be represented by 









.  That is, expected 
damages fall with the employment of more M and/or L.  L and M therefore constitute the 
two key types of precaution exercisable by landfill operators, and the landfill operator is 
willing to undertake some cost of precaution in order to modulate expected damages.   
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To complete the characterization of potential environmental damages surrounding 
landfills, we turn now to what we view as a most intriguing aspect of the landfill 
operator’s economic problem: the uncertainty over the threshold levels of monitoring and 
of leachate control required by federal law.  That is, while US federal law requires some 
degree of waste quality monitoring and leachate control—and while there are specific 
thresholds for heavy metal counts in local groundwater samples that cannot be 
statistically exceeded—the threshold levels of monitoring and leachate control that would 
counteract charges of culpable negligence are, in our view, ambiguous.  We raise this 
issue because Kolstad et al. (1990), Bartsch (1997) and Dyar and Wagner (2003) each 
found that this type of uncertainty can lead to socially inefficient rates of precaution 
being taken.  We here show how their methodologies can be extended to the case of 
MSW management.   
We propose that the landfill operator is uncertain over the negligence-nullifying 
levels of both M and L.  Assume the landfill operator has conducted a mean assessment 
of the most likely thresholds of each, M  and L , and assume that the operator has formed 
probability distribution functions  and   for inputs M and L, based upon the 
legal histories with which it is familiar.  Following Kolstad et al. (1990) and Dyar and 
Wagner (2003), we can represent the probability that the operator’s actual choice of 
monitoring, 
) (M fM ) (L fL
M ˆ , fails to ward off charges of negligence and liability as 
 (the area under the probability density function from the 
operator’s choice of M to infinity).  We may likewise represent the probability that the 
operator’s actual choice of leachate control, 
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L ˆ , fails to ward off charges of negligence 
and liability as  .  This being the case, we may write the risk-neutral 
landfill operator’s economic problem as one of choosing L and M to maximize the 
following expected profit function:
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The corresponding first-order conditions, when rearranged and when suppressing 
some notation for clarity, are: 
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The interpretation of (2) and (3) is that the profit maximizing firm seeks to hire 
each input such that its marginal revenue product equals its expected marginal cost.  In 
this case of facing an uncertain negligence rule, the marginal revenue products pick up an 
additional positive term, in comparison to a case in which the landfill operator faces a 












dR M L , each square-bracketed 
                                                 
8 Note that our specification has much in common with the approach favored by Beavis and Dobbs (1987, 
119, Eq. 15). 
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term in (2) and (3) is negative.  Combining these facts with the negative signs in front of 
each square-bracketed term confirms that each input’s marginal revenue product is 
increased by the extent to which it wards off culpable negligence. 
As Bartsch (1997, 142) and others have shown in other law and economics 
contexts, it is useful to think in our MSW context of the two (bracketed and unbracketed) 
pieces of each marginal revenue product (MRP) function as the contributions each input 
makes to the management of “good” waste and “bad” waste, respectively.  That is, each 
unit of waste Q admitted to the landfill has uncertain quality.  There is a relatively benign 
element that requires input to manage but which has a negligible effect upon expected 
damages.  The first term in each MRP function reflects the value of the input toward the 
management of this relatively benign waste.  The second term in each MRP function 
represents the value of each input in reducing the expected damages from the 
troublesome elements of waste inadvertently or intentionally sent to the MSW landfill by 
households and firms.  If the legal standards are certain and are set at the socially 
efficient rates, the 
* M and   implicitly defined by equations (2) and (3) represent both 
the privately and socially optimal rates of input utilization.  If the disposal facility 











, the privately 
optimal input usage will be less than the socially optimal input usage.  We must note that 
the positive flows of pollution from the landfill at the social optimum define the socially 
optimal environmental standards to which the firm should be held.  As Viscusi and 
Hamilton (1999) and others have shown, statutory pollution standards are not necessarily 
established at economically efficient levels (that is, where the marginal social benefit of 
abating health risks from the landfill just equal the marginal social cost of abatement).  
We return to this aspect of the model later when we discuss the possibility that current 
environmental standards are not set at these socially efficient levels. 
   
3.  Discussion of Results and Directions for Future Research 
Several extensions of this baseline model suggest themselves.  An examination of 
Equation (1) and the first-order conditions (2) and (3) shows that there are three areas of 
comparative statics to consider.  They are (a) changes in the legal framework (or the 
firm’s perceptions of the legal framework), as expressed by RL(L) and RM(M); (b) 
changes in the price of waste quality monitoring M; and (c) changes in the price of 
leachate control L.   
 
3.1. Changes in the Legal Framework, or Perceptions Thereof 
With respect to changes in the actual or perceived legal framework, Kolstad et al. 
(1990) showed that when faced with ex ante regulation and a negligence rule—as we 
have here in this MSW landfill context—harming parties may not implement the socially 
efficient rate of precaution.  Building upon Kolstad et al. (1990), and inspired by 
Doremus (1999), Dyar and Wagner (2003) considered how a harming party’s private 
actions would be affected by an impression that the court looks relatively more favorably 
upon one abatement strategy versus another.  Dyar and Wagner (2003) were especially 
interested in whether a wildlife manager’s choice of certain inputs may provoke a court to 
ratchet upward its assessment of the manager’s culpability for damages done by the 
species under its management (wolves).   They showed that indeed this can have a 
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countervailing effect upon the efficient selection of inputs, as firms should be expected to 
shy away from actions that may be interpreted as admissions of culpability.  Bartsch 
(1997) and Hutchinson and van’t Veld (2005) explore a related possibility in which some 
inputs that modulate environmental damages are observable to outside parties while other 
inputs are not; they show that the relative observability of the firm’s precautionary efforts 
can cause the firm to choose socially inefficient combinations of such inputs.
9  In our 
MSW model that features multiple precautionary strategies, it may be the case that the 
court would view the landfill operator as more culpable for leachate control failures than 
for waste quality monitoring failures, given the relatively unobservable waste quality 
monitoring efforts by households and the consequent nonpoint nature of the waste 
received by landfills.  If this is the case, the landfill manager could be expected to shade 
his or her management strategy to favor leachate control; such a strategy may not be 
socially efficient, however. 
Another type of uncertainty to take into account is the evolution of environmental 
standards and the expectation that they will become stricter over time.  Practices that 
were viewed approvingly in the past may tomorrow be viewed as negligent practice.  For 
instance, as a result of the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments to RCRA, in 
1990 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency added 25 organic chemicals to the list of 
regulated toxic wastes and mandated replacement of the Extraction Procedure Toxicity 
Test (EP) with the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP).
10  One could 
expect that future regulations will expand in scope to deal with waste constituents not 
presently addressed. 
 
3.2. Changes in the Price of Waste Quality Monitoring M 
Thus far we have assumed that monitoring of waste quality can only be 
accomplished at the gates of the landfill.  In reality, of course, households that send waste 
for disposal exercise some amount of monitoring.  Depending upon the incentive 
structure households face—and depending upon the information households have 
regarding recycling, MSW and hazardous wastes—households could exercise more waste 
quality monitoring than is presently undertaken. Turning now to consideration (b) noted 
above, our framework could accommodate the addition of the household sector (such as 
presented by Choe and Fraser (1999)).  In such a model, an improvement in household 
monitoring of waste quality can yield Pareto-improving trades between households and 
landfill operators.  Specifically, a Pareto-improvement can occur if households obtain a 
decrease in the legal waste disposal cost and the waste disposal operator obtains 
verifiable waste quality monitoring from households more cheaply than its own waste 
quality monitoring cost.  Millock et al. (2002) propose a monitoring mechanism for 
counteracting nonpoint source pollution that in our view could be useful in this waste 
quality monitoring situation.  Millock et al. (2002) emphasize that the efficiency of the 
mechanism requires nonpoint source polluters to volunteer to be monitored, and to pay 
for their own monitoring equipment.  This could occur here if the discounted total cost of 
                                                 
9 Hutchinson and van’t Veld (2005) introduce the additional innovation that unobservable efforts modulate 
the probability of an accident occurring while the observable efforts modulate the size of damage, should 
an accident occur.  Specifying the accident function A in our model in this manner could well enable 
additional useful insights for MSW management.  
10 See U.S.DOE (2000). 
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household compliance over some period of time is less than the discounted stream of 
disposal fee savings (i.e., this defines each household’s incentive-compatibility 
constraint).  Likewise, the landfill operator’s per-unit revenue p would fall by some 
increment while the waste quality monitoring cost   would fall by some increment; if 
the landfill operator’s profit rises, the operator’s incentive-compatibility constraint is also 
met. We can imagine that households may very well have lower marginal costs for 
monitoring waste quality than does the landfill operator.  This is reasonable, given the 
scale difference in monitoring one item at a time in one’s kitchen versus sorting through 
truckloads of refuse at the gates of the landfill.  In order for the above voluntary program 
to take shape, technologies must exist that enable households to verifiably monitor waste 
quality.  A relatively simple example of “verifiable monitoring equipment” would be 
clear plastic bags coupled with random auditing of the contents of such bags by the 
landfill operator as the bags are picked up at the household; Kasperson (2000) describes 
such a mechanism that is currently employed in Nantucket, Massachusetts.       
M w
 
3.3.  Changes in the Price of Leachate Control L 
One interesting aspect of industrial organization is the extent to which firms will 
adopt improved technologies as they become available.  The evidence is that some 
technologies are not adopted as quickly as one would have forecasted.  Even though there 
may exist opportunities to reduce marginal costs of production via new technology, a 
significant motivation for technology adoption delay regards the various forms of fixed 
costs the firm faces when choosing to adopt.  One form of fixed cost would be a licensing 
fee that the firm must pay in order to employ the new technology.  Another form of fixed 
cost could be refitting costs necessary in order to make initial design features mesh with 
the new technology.  In either case, adopting the improved technology involves a 
reduction in the firm’s variable costs and an increase in the firm’s fixed costs. 
Our model can be generalized to take this aspect of MSW into account.  The 
disposal operator’s leachate control cost   in Equation (1) can be replaced with the 
total cost function  , where  is the fixed cost of obtaining the new leachate 
control technology and  .  The landfill operator compares the fixed cost with the 
marginal cost savings; if the fixed cost is relatively high, technology adoption is 
postponed, even though the new technology is clearly more efficient and cheaper to 
utilize on a per-unit basis.  Assuming functional forms and model parameters, one could 
solve for the threshold fixed cost   that the landfill manager would be willing to pay for 
any new leachate control technology adoption. 
L wL
L w F L L ′ + L F
L L w w < ′
L F
Interestingly, note that in the context of our model that any Pareto-improvement 
accomplished by greater household monitoring of waste quality (described in the 
previous section of our paper) could be used to overcome the fixed costs described in this 
section.  Thinking about these two features of the landfill manager’s problem in a dual 
manner enables us to see how difficulties with cooperation on waste quality monitoring 
can have the effect of restricting the implementation of new technologies.  This insight 
from our model is consistent with Stranlund’s (1997) argument regarding the utilization 
of public aid to motivate greater environmental compliance by firms.   
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